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The heightened interest of African countries to access international capital markets has put 
public debt sustainability once again high on the continent’s policy agenda. Applying the 
‘stabilizing primary balance approach’ to sustainability shows that the primary balances 
exceeded those required to keep public debt at the 2007 level in about half of the countries 
studied. In several cases with higher debt burdens, the balances were also above those needed to 
reduce public debt-to-GDP to sustainable thresholds. However, in most countries the main driver 
of sustainability has been the interest rate – growth differential (IRGD), underscoring the 
importance of maintaining and even accelerating growth as well as utilizing the borrowing space 
for growth-enhancing outlays. Fiscal policies will need to play a greater role in maintaining debt 
sustainability in the future, especially since the IRGDs are likely to narrow over the longer term.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Shortly after being hit by the global financial crisis in 2009, Africa staged a robust recovery. 
Four years later, it is one of the fastest growing world regions.2 The continent’s performance is 
projected to stay strong in 2013 and 2014, the fragile global recovery notwithstanding. Several 
studies have now pointed out Africa’s potential to become a global growth pole over the longer 
term (AfDB et al., 2010; ECA, 2012). However, the vast infrastructure and human capital gaps 
constrain Africa’s development. Balancing the need to scale up growth-enhancing public outlays 
and debt sustainability is then a key policy challenge ahead (AfDB, 2010; Mu, 2012). 
 
With Africa’s high growth, reduced risk premia, low interest rates, and strengthened debt 
management capacity, sustainable levels of public debt may need to be reconsidered, especially 
in the frontier markets.3 During the past decade, debt sustainability has improved markedly and 
Africa’s debt-to-GDP today is lower than in decades. Still, the global financial crisis has left 
some countries with looming fiscal challenges and deteriorating public debt sustainability. This 
paper analyzes the public debt legacy of the crisis in Africa, utilizing the debt-stabilizing primary 
balance framework as in, Buiter (1985), Blanchard (1990), Blanchard et al. (1990) and more 
recently Escolano (2010) and Contessi (2012). The uniform approach allows for comparisons of 
fiscal policies across countries and over time and identifying main factors of the debt dynamics.  
 
We find that during 2007 – 2012 the primary balances exceeded those required to keep debt-to-
GDP at the 2007 level in about half of the countries. In several cases with higher debt burdens, 
the balances were also above those needed to reduce debt-to-GDP to sustainable thresholds. In 
many countries with sustainable debt path, the outcome was driven by a favorable interest rate – 
growth differential (IRGD) rather than fiscal stance. However, fiscal policies will need to play a 
more prominent role in maintaining public debt sustainability in the future, especially when the 
real interest rates rise with the tightening of the monetary policy in advanced economies.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. After this Introduction, Section II summarizes the latest fiscal 
and external indicators. Section III presents varied fiscal outcomes among African sub-groups 
and countries as well as their impact on fiscal space four years after the global financial crisis. 
Section IV concludes with challenges ahead and policy options.  
 
II. Fiscal legacy of the global financial crisis in Africa 
 
African countries – which entered the global financial crisis with overall low debt levels, 
adequate foreign exchange reserves, and moderate inflation – experienced the crisis shock 
mostly through cuts in external demand and liquidity shortages. Where policy buffers allowed, 
the governments adopted counter-cyclical responses to the crisis, usually in the form of increased 
capital outlays and/or monetary easing (Kasekende et al., 2010).4   
2 According to the IMF WEO (2013) and the African Economic Outlook by the AfDBet al. (2013), in 2012, 5 out of 
10 most rapidly growing countries globally were in Africa. These countries were: Libya, Sierra Leone, Niger, 
Liberia, and Cỏte d’Ivoire. Despite Africa’s impressive growth take-off, many countries on the continent, including 
the most advanced ones, are yet to reach inclusive development path (Ncube et al., 2013; AfDB 2011). 
3 Frontier markets are countries that issued international sovereign bonds or have sovereign credit rating (Annex I).    
4 Africa’s experience contrasts that of the developed countries where the global financial crisis of 2008 – 2009 led to 
a major private sector de-leveraging and public debt accumulation. In Europe, this has manifested itself as sovereign 
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This Section examines differences in fiscal outcomes in Africa between 2008 and 2012, both at 
the aggregate and country level. Both ‘stock’ (debt) and ‘flow’ (balance) types of outcomes are 
considered. This distinction is needed since, as shown below, deteriorating fiscal balances do not 
necessarily raise debt, while improved balances can be associated with higher indebtedness. 
 
Africa’s fiscal deficit comparable to other groups 
 
Overall, the global financial crisis has left African countries with weakened fiscal (and current 
account) balances. Specifically, four years after the crisis, fiscal balances remain lower than 
before the crisis in about 2/3rd of the countries. While the magnitude of the continent’s fiscal 
deterioration is similar to that in other developing and emerging market countries, its drivers 
differ. Unlike in richer countries where the increased deficits were caused mostly by stimulus 
policies, in Africa external shocks played an important role (Figure 1).  
 
1a. Fiscal Balances, regions (% of GDP)         1b. Public Debt, regions (% of GDP) 
  
 
1c. Fiscal Balances, AFR groups (% of GDP)    1d. Current Accounts, AFR groups (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AfDB AEO and IMF WEO databases (May 2013).  Note: Results are 
medians for the world regions and averages for AFR groups.  
debt problem. Also, Africa’s reliance on expenditures in the crisis response differed from developed countries, 
where the stimulus polices included tax cuts, which are typically less effective in stimulating growth response.  
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Fiscal balances and public debt ratios on the continent have exhibited notable heterogeneity and 
variations even during such short time period as the aftermath of the global financial crisis 
(Figure 1). In general though, countries with stronger fiscal positions at the outset of the crisis 
implemented more decisive counter-cyclical measures and experienced larger deterioration of 
their fiscal balances (Figure 2). Specifically:  
 
 After recording sizeable fiscal surpluses in the run up to the crisis, oil exporters saw their 
fiscal balances fall markedly in 2009. Nevertheless most countries at least partly 
recovered with favorable oil prices and the group posted a small surplus in 2012. Despite 
this rebound, oil exporters need to tackle the underlying structural weaknesses and reduce 
dependence on volatile commodity revenues; 
 
 Frontier markets experienced the largest deterioration of fiscal balances and public debt 
built up, as a result of the counter-cyclical measures adopted in 2009 and beyond. Many 
of these countries have maintained expansionary policies.5 Their access to financing has 
allowed for maintaining budget deficits and financing them through sovereign bond 
issues, as Namibia and Zambia did externally and Kenya locally.  
 
 Most of the other countries, especially some of the fragile states, could not adopt 
counter-cyclical measures during the crisis, due to both limited fiscal policy buffers and 
access to borrowing. Their fiscal balances have thus weakened less than those of the 
frontier markets. These countries have also posted current account deficits in double 
digits, raising concerns about vulnerability to external shocks. 
 
Figure 2. Africa’s fiscal balances: 2008 levels and changes in 2008 – 2012e, % of GDP 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AfDB database.  Note: Correlation coefficient is -0.756 at 1% 
significance level. Data for 2012 are preliminary estimates.  
 
 
5 Egypt, for example, continues to post deficits (in terms of GDP) near or in double digits, reflecting high subsidies 
and public sector wages. 
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Decline in the overall debt level 
Africa’s public debt-to-GDP ratio declined during 2008 – 2012 (Figure 1b), as widened primary 
fiscal deficits (i.e. deficits net of interest payments) were offset by factors such as low or 
negative real interest rates, high growth, and in some low income countries also debt relief.6 
Differences again emerged across groups and countries. In contrast to the other African groups, 
public debt levels have increased in the frontier markets. The increase reflected mostly 
expansionary policies during the crisis years and beyond and in some cases also sovereign bond 
issuances on international markets. Total external debt (public and private) across subgroups has 
followed similar patters as public debt (Figure 3). Even though most of the external debt is 
public, the corporate debt has been growing. 
Figure 3. Africa’s subgroups: public and external debts follow similar patters 
3a. Public Debt, AFR groups (% of GDP) 3b. External Debt, AFR groups (% of GDP) 1/ 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AfDB and IMF databases. 
Grouping the countries by income shows that the total public debt increased in middle income 
(ADB) countries and declined in low income (ADF) countries. Two observations stand out. First, 
albeit rising, the overall debt level in middle-income countries is still markedly lower than that in 
ADF countries.7 Second, the current Africa’s debt is the lowest in decades, with the fastest 
decline posted by the most indebted countries thanks to debt relief and accompanying prudent 
policies that made the relief possible.  As the composition of public debt has shifted from 
external to domestic (and from official to unofficial) creditors since 2000 while external reserves 
rose, countries vulnerability to external shocks has subsided.  
While the relatively low overall public debt levels and declining trend are positive signs, they do 
not leave room for policymakers’ complacency. First, vast differences among countries prevail, 
with the highest debt level (over 100% of GDP) in 2012 held in Eritrea (126 % of GDP) and 
6 In several countries (e.g., Ghana, Egypt) exchange rate depreciation amplified the total debt burden through the re-
valuation of the foreign debt. 
7 However, middle income countries typically hold a larger share of short term debt, making them more vulnerable 
to interest rate and rollover risk, as the case of Swaziland illustrates.  
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Sudan (112 % of GDP); debt exceeded 80% of GDP in several other countries (e.g., Cape Verde, 
Mauritania, Sao Tome Principe, Seychelles.8 Second, there is no predetermined debt threshold 
that would indicate that fiscal (solvency) crisis is about to occur. While it is clear that higher 
public debt makes a country more vulnerable to a crisis (other factors being equal), it is not 
possible to determine the specific tipping point. Third, widening fiscal deficits indicate shorter-
term fiscal vulnerabilities (including to liquidity crisis) and reduced fiscal space. 
 
Characteristics of Africa’s public debt 
 
This section summarizes key characteristics and patterns of continent’s public debt during 2003 
– 2012. First, a strong positive relationship between nominal public debt and GDP highlights that 
African countries, as those in other regions (Ferrarini and Ramaydani, 2012), that have had a 
greater capacity to contract debt (measured by GDP) have done so. Since the period covered 
includes ‘pre-MDRI’ years, oil exporters and frontier markets did not have higher public debt-to-
GDP ratios than other countries.9 Rather several fragile and less developed countries had the 
highest average public debt burdens during the past 10 years (Figure 4).10  
 
In the current debt sustainability analysis and practice, the debt-to-GDP ratio is only one 
indicator of the country’s capacity to contract loans and repay them. Debt-to-revenue ratio is 
another measure, which reflects more directly resources available to the governments. There are 
also some indications that African countries with higher debt-to-GDP ratios tend to have lower 
revenue-to-GDP ratios (and thus lower debt repayment capacity) and vice versa. 
 
Figure 4a. Africa: Public Debt and GDP, 2003 – 2012e 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AfDB database.  Note: Correlation coefficient is 0.845  
at 1% significance level. Data reflect 2003 – 2012 averages (in US$) in log scale.  
 
 
8 Some countries (e.g., Ghana, Swaziland) had lower debt levels but accumulated sizeable arrears.  
9 MDRI denotes multi-lateral debt relief initiative, which took place in mid-2000s.  
10 Unlike the paper by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), results of which were questioned by Egert (2012), Herndon et al. 
(2013) and others, we leave the issue of the linearity of relation between debt and growth to further research.   
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Figure 4b. Public debt - to GDP and per capital GDP, 2003 – 2012e 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AfDB database. Note: Correlation coefficient -0.524 at 1% significance 
level. Data reflect 2003 – 2012 averages in log scale. 
 
Fiscal outcomes in individual countries 
 
In Figure 5, the lower right quadrant captures countries experiencing both rising debt and 
weakening fiscal balance. Among non-ADF countries (MICs) these countries included oil 
exporters (Gabon, Algeria) and frontier markets (Cape Verde), while small countries such Sao 
Tome Principe and again oil exporters (e.g., Sudan, Equatorial Guinea) were in this quadrant 
among the ADF countries. Table 1, Annex II, gives similar information by analytical groupings, 
together with external shocks in the form of changes in external debt and current account deficit.  
 
Figure 5. Stock and Flow Fiscal Outcomes in Africa, by income groups, 2008 – 2012e 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on AfDB AEO and IMF WEO databases. Note: Stock shocks correspond to 
changes in public sector debt and flow shocks correspond to changes in fiscal balances. 
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Fiscal stance and policy flexibility in Africa’s sub-groups can be summarized as follows: 
 
 Oil exporters remain fiscally most sound group in Africa in terms of levels (static sense).  
Even though their fiscal space was substantially cut, it remains the strongest in absolute 
terms; in part because of reserves.  
 
 In fragile states, public debt decreased markedly due to HIPC/MDRI and prudent policies 
that accompanied this debt relief. However policy buffers in these countries are limited 
because of high current account deficits and low reserves. Moreover, dependence of this 
group on external aid remains high; 
 
 With rising fiscal deficits and debt – in part because of issuance of external sovereign 
bonds -- fiscal sustainability has been gaining attention as a policy priority in frontier 
markets. Several countries from this group have recently had their sovereign credit 
ratings downgraded. On a positive side, Nigeria received upgrade in the early 2013.   
 
III. How Sustainable is Africa’s Public Debt Path? 
 
This section summarizes the standard sovereign debt-to-GDP sustainability analysis based on 
contributions of the primary balance and the real interest-growth differential, as in Contessi 
(2012) and Escolano (2010). The changes in public debt-to-GDP over time are decomposed into:  
 
tt
t
t
t
t
t
tt pdg
gd
g
rdd −
+
−
+
=− −−− 111 11
    (1) 
 
where td is the stock of public debt (as % of GDP) at time t; tr is the real interest rate; tg  is the 
real GDP growth (in %); and tp  is the primary fiscal balance (in % of GDP).
11  
 
The two main approaches to the debt sustainability are: (i) the approach of the IMF and the 
World Bank, which looks at debt path projections and how they relate to thresholds; and (ii) the 
debt-stabilizing primary balance approach, which looks for the primary balances to achieve a 
chosen debt path, given the assumptions about the evolution of the real interest rate r and growth 
g (Wyplosz, 2005; Chalk and Hemming, 2000). In what follows, we utilize the debt-stabilizing 
primary balance approach, which is simple, transparent and has minimal data requirements (real 
interest rate and growth). The basic form of the approach computes the primary balances that 
would keep the debt-to-GDP ratio at its current level. From (1), this can be described as follows: 
 
*
1
*
1 −+
−
= t
t
tt
t dg
grp      (2) 
11 The initial stock of debt, 0d , is set and Ponzi schemes are excluded. Equation (1) also abstracts from impacts of 
exchange rate and ‘below the line’ adjustments. Huang and Xie (2008) extend the classical, partial equilibrium 
approach to stabilizing primary debt balance to a general equilibrium analysis.   
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where *tp is the stabilizing primary balance and 
*
td is the stable debt-to-GDP ratio. The difference 
between the stabilizing and the actual primary balance is referred to as ‘primary balance gap’. A positive 
gap would mean that in the absence of fiscal adjustment, the debt-to-GDP ratio would rise over time.  
 
From (1) it also follows that when the real interest rate is above the growth rate of GDP, the 
debt-to-GDP ratio will rise unless the primary balance outweighs the impact of this differential. 
Decomposing )1/( tt gr + into )1/()( ttti γπ +− , where tγ  denotes the growth of nominal GDP, 
illustrates that inflation impacts the debt-to-GDP ratio through lowering the real interest rate.  
 
Omitting the time subscript t and given an initial debt-to-GDP ratio ( 0d ) and a ratio to be 
achieved in N periods ( *Nd ), the constant primary balance (
*p ) to achieve this becomes:12 
 
))1((
1)1( 0
** ddp N
N
N −+−+
= −
−
λ
λ
λ      (3) 
 
where   )1/()( ggr +−=λ .   
 
Debt dynamics, real interest rate-growth differential and debt-stabilizing balance  
 
Drawing on (1), we now look into what factors – growth, real interest rates, primary balance or 
other factors (including debt relief) – drove public debt changes in Africa and its groups. On the 
continent as a whole and in all groups, high growth and negative real interests contributed to 
decline in debt burden. While growth played an important role across Africa, the negative 
interest rates helped lower debt especially in low income (including fragile) countries, reflecting 
the concessional terms of their loans. In contrast, in frontier markets where governments often 
borrow on market terms – either on domestics markets as in Kenya or on international bond 
markets as in Ghana, Namibia, etc. – the contribution of real interest to cutting the debt burden 
has been lower. Except for oil exporters, fiscal policies led to debt accumulation in all Africa’s 
subgroups. Finally, low income countries saw their debt levels fall due to debt relief (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Drivers of Government Debt Dynamics in Africa, 2008 – 2012e 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AfDB AEO and IMF WEO databases.  Note: ‘Other factors’ include 
debt relief, exchange rate changes and ad-hoc debt reclassification, among others. 
12 For derivation, see Escolano (2010).  
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Drawing on (1), we now ask what fiscal policies – in terms of primary fiscal balances (as % of 
GDP) – would had stabilized the debt ratios at their 2007 levels in the frontier markets and 
middle income oil exporters during 2008 – 2012.13 For countries where the initial (2007) level of 
debt exceeded 40% of GDP, we also examine what type of fiscal policies (primary balances) 
would have resulted in debt reduction to this benchmark. 
 
Results are summarized in Figure 7. The left panel shows the required primary balance that 
would stabilize the debt ratio in frontier markets (and middle-income oil exporters) at their 2007 
level. The right panel shows the balance needed for reducing debt level to 40% of GDP by 2012, 
provided that the 2007 debt was above this threshold. 
 
Figure 7. Primary Balance Gap, average for 2008 – 2012e (% of GDP) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AfDB AEO and IMF WEO databases.  
 
As shown in the left panel of Figure 7, in more than half of the countries studied the primary 
balance was above the one required to keep the public debt-to-GDP ratio at its 2007 level. 
Taking this perspective would then suggest that fiscal stance of majority of the countries in this 
group is sustainable. If countries’ growth and real effective interest rates would remain at their 
2007 – 2012 average levels, the debt-to-GDP ratios of all countries above the 45 degree line 
would decline. While some of these countries did not exercise fiscal prudence and in fact ran 
sizeable fiscal deficits, their debt paths were mostly driven by the negative the real interest rate – 
growth differential (Ghana, Mozambique).  
 
In contrast, in countries where the actual primary balance is below the required one for keeping 
debt stable (e.g., Botswana, Cape Verde, Senegal, Swaziland) the IRGD differential was 
outweighed by fiscal policy, leading to an increase in public debt-to-GDP ratio.  
 
13 Sovereign bonds of these countries have recently received heightened attention of foreign investors. 
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In some of the countries above the 45 degree in the left panel, the 2007 public debt-to-GDP ratio 
was above 40%, pointing to a need for fiscal adjustment.14 Right panel of Figure 7 lists the 
required primary balance that would had reduced public debt-to-GDP ratio to 40% by 2012. 
Some of the countries that had the 2007 level of debt above 40% were required to undertake 
more substantive fiscal adjustment than they actually did.15 At the same time, in about half of the 
frontier markets and oil exporters featured in Figure 7 the fiscal stance was sustainable. Hence if 
in the next five years growth and real interest remained at 2007 – 2012 levels, debt ratios in all 
economies above the 45 degree line in the right panel would be at or below 40 percent of GDP.16  
Table 1. Calculation of Real Interest-Growth Differentials, 2008 – 2012 (%) 
Real GDP 
growth 
Nominal eff. 
interest rate 
Change in 
GDP deflator 
Real effective 
interest rate 
Interest Rate- 
Growth Differential 
Benin 3.5 1.6 3.9 -2.2 -5.8 
Burkina Faso 5.8 1.8 4.9 -3.1 -8.9 
Burundi 4.1 2.2 14.9 -12.6 -16.7 
Cape Verde 4.9 1.6 3.6 -2.0 -6.9 
Central African Rep. 2.8 2.6 3.4 -0.8 -3.6 
Chad 3.8 1.9 6.9 -5.0 -8.8 
DRC 6.0 5.6 19.0 -13.4 -19.4 
Republic of Congo 5.8 2.0 6.9 -4.9 -10.7 
Côte d'Ivoire 2.7 2.8 3.1 -0.4 -3.1 
Egypt 4.2 6.0 11.0 -5.1 -9.3 
The Gambia 3.7 4.7 4.0 0.7 -3.0 
Guinea 2.9 2.7 14.7 -12.1 -14.9 
Guinea-Bissau 2.7 0.5 3.3 -2.8 -5.6 
Kenya 3.8 4.7 9.6 -4.8 -8.7 
Lesotho 5.2 1.8 6.5 -4.6 -9.8 
Liberia 6.8 0.9 5.8 -4.9 -11.6 
Mali 3.4 1.7 5.5 -3.8 -7.2 
Mauritania 3.5 1.8 7.9 -6.1 -9.6 
Morocco 4.4 4.6 1.9 2.7 -1.7 
Namibia 3.5 5.7 6.5 -0.8 -4.4 
Nigeria 6.9 8.1 8.6 -0.6 -7.5 
Rwanda 8.6 1.9 7.6 -5.7 -14.3 
Senegal 3.3 3.0 2.5 0.4 -2.8 
Seychelles 2.3 5.7 13.7 -8.0 -10.3 
Sierra Leone 7.9 3.4 12.8 -9.4 -17.3 
South Africa 2.2 7.8 7.0 0.8 -1.5 
Togo 4.0 1.5 5.2 -3.7 -7.7 
Tunisia 2.5 4.3 4.9 -0.7 -3.1 
Uganda 5.9 4.5 11.6 -7.1 -13.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IMF and AfDB databases. 
14 In the context of fiscal consolidation debates, 40% public debt-to-GDP ratio is often recommended as prudent 
limit that developing and emerging market countries should not exceed on a long-term basis. IMF (2013) provides 
more nuanced debt thresholds based on countries’ level of development and capacity to repay debt.  
15 As this exercise did not take into account the exchange rate depreciation and ad hoc changes to the debt stock, it 
may have underestimated the size of the fiscal adjustment needed to stabilize or reduce the public debt. 
16 This includes possibility declining debt-to-GDP ratio in the face of running primary deficits, provided that real 
interest and growth differential offset the factor.   
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Table 1 lists the calculated real effective interest rate -growth differential (IRGD) for the period 
during and after the crisis (2007 – 2012e). It shows that in all countries for which data was 
available, the IRGD was negative and exceeded -10% in about one third of the countries. For the 
few countries with positive real interest rate (e.g., Senegal, Morocco), growth eroded the debt-
ratio enough to more than offset the interest impact. However, in few cases, the narrow IRGD 
was not able to counter the impact of sizeable primary deficits (above). 
 
Case studies 
 
Ghana: Rising debt amid rapid growth 
 
Currently, Ghana is among the fastest growing economies in Africa and globally. At 6.5 percent 
a year during 2004 – 08, the country was exceeding Africa’s average and its own past record. 
The improved performance reflected good policies and strengthened institutions. While the 
economy still expanded by 4 percent during the crisis, its performance rested mostly on high 
prices of gold and cocoa. Driven in part by oil production, average growth of 9.8 percent a year 
in 2010 - 2012 has put Ghana among the fastest growing world economies.  
 
The fiscal deficits since mid-2000s have contributed to the increase of public debt to almost 50 
percent of GDP. With budgetary outlays following political cycles (e.g. rising during or before 
election years), the deficit reached 8.5 percent of GDP in 2008 (year of general elections), 
leaving no room for countercyclical measures when the crisis hit a year later. Instead, in 2009 the 
government resorted to pro-cyclical budgetary cuts and accumulated arrears to private 
contractors. Similarly, during the next general elections in 2012, the deficit rose to 11.5 percent 
of GDP (up from 4.1 percent in 2011) on the back of a ballooning wage bill, energy subsidies, 
and rising interest payments with cedi under pressure (Government of Ghana, 2013).  
 
After receiving debt relief (MDRI) in 2006, Ghana’s public debt expanded despite a favorable 
interest rate – growth differential. Specifically, at 45 percent of GDP in 2012, the debt level was 
similar to that before the MDRI. Besides fiscal policy, the weakening of cedi has played a role in 
recent debt accumulation (Figure 8). Table 2 illustrates the primary balance gaps, namely 
differences between the actual primary balance and the ones associated with stabilizing debt at 
2007 level (30 percent of GDP) or such that would gradually reach the 40 percent benchmark.     
 
Table 2. Ghana: Primary balance gaps, 2008 – 2012e 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e   2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 
primary balance (% of GDP) 
 
debt (% of GDP) 
Actual  -6.2 -3.0 -4.1 -1.4 -8.4 
 
30.2 36.1 37.4 39.3 49.2 
Debt at 2007 level -6.6 2.9 -2.1 1.4 1.1 
 
30.6 30.6 30.6 30.6 30.6 
Debt at 40% opt 1  -6.2 -3.0 -4.1 -1.4 0.8 
 
30.2 36.1 37.4 39.3 40.0 
Debt at 40% opt 2 -8.6 0.9 -4.6 -1.2 -0.4   32.6 34.6 36.4 38.1 40.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on AfDB and IMF databases.  
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Figure 8. Ghana: Dynamics of Public Debt in Recent Years 
 
8a. Public Debt: by type (% of GDP)  8b. Cumulative Public Debt, by factors (% of GDP) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on AfDB and IMF databases.  
Looking forward, the government plans to continue financing part of the fiscal deficits through 
sovereign bonds. In 2007 Ghana was one of the first countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to issue 
sovereign Eurobond ($750 million). The country has already mentioned its intentions to 
refinance the bond in 2013 and possibly raise additional funds. This seems manageable, with the 
total external debt amounting to about 20 percent and short term debt only to about 3 percent of 
GDP. Nevertheless, absent spending restraints, the additional debt could accumulate quickly and 
country’s creditworthiness and ratings weaken, raising borrowing cost. The tight monetary 
policy would also raise interest. These trends underscore the importance of strengthening fiscal 
institutions and public financial management, using the borrowed funds judiciously for growth-
enhancing outlays, and making growth more robust through diversification.  
 
Swaziland: From liquidity shortages to sustainability challenges?  
 
At 1.9 percent annual average rate, Swaziland was among the least growing countries in Africa 
during 2001-12. Prior to the global financial crisis, the country experienced a fiscal revenue 
boom driven by SACU receipts. However, the windfall revenues financed public wages rather 
than investments to increase productive capacity. When the SACU revenues collapsed in the 
aftermath of the crisis, the budget deficit widened to 11.5 percent of GDP in 2010 (Figure 9).  
 
With ballooning deficit and limited access to borrowing, the country needed fiscal adjustment. 
The government negotiated program with the IMF in the early 2011, but was not able to meet its 
targets. The wage bill thus remained among the highest in Africa. The budget support from 
MDBs, including the African Development Bank, was put on hold. Confidence of domestic 
investors waned, reducing further the available deficit financing. By mid-2011, the government 
faced a liquidity crisis, leading to delays or cuts in expenditures, rising domestic debt, and 
arrears. The deficit was falling faster than expected, with negative implications for growth.  
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Besides impacting service delivery, the fiscal crisis also spilled over into other sectors. Sizeable 
government arrears to private sector contractors slashed further growth prospects and led to 
rising non-performing loans of the banking sector. In turn, the banks took a cautious approach to 
lending, and the real private sector credit growth has been very low. The official foreign 
exchange reserves, which were used to finance the government deficit, fell to mere 1.9 months of 
imports in early March 2012, raising concerns about sustainability of the Lilangeni-Rand peg.  
 
The markedly improved SACU revenues in 2012/13 and projected for 2013/14 have removed the 
urgency of fiscal adjustment. Nevertheless, the structural weaknesses that led to the fiscal crisis 
should be addressed. The priority areas of reforms, outlined in the Updated Fiscal Adjustment 
Roadmap 2012 that the government prepared with the help of the AfDB and UNDP, include:  
 
 On the resource side, the country needs to reduce dependency on volatile SACU revenues 
and mobilize domestic sources, deepen domestic financial markets, and develop 
innovative sources of finance.  
 
 On the expenditure side, rebalancing outlays to investment (which accounts for less than 
10% of GDP) would help accelerate growth over the longer term. Preferably, the 
budgeting would be done on a multi-year basis, with medium term expenditure 
framework and possibly also an expenditure rule in place.  
 
 The country needs to manage volatile SACU revenues better, and in particularly save 
enough during the boom years to allow for counter-cyclical expenditures in downturns.  
 
Figure 9. Swaziland: Recent Developments in Key Fiscal Indicators 
 
9a. Government budget (% of GDP)                   9b. Public wages bill (2008-2010, % of GDP) 
 
Sources: African Development, Bank, IMF and Government of Swaziland.  
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Figure 10. Swaziland: Dynamics of Public Debt in Recent Years 
 
10a. Public Debt: by type (% of GDP)  10b.Cumulative Public Debt, by factors (% of GDP) 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF and AfDB databases.  
 
While public debt remains low, it has grown rapidly in recent years -- from 13 percent of GDP in 
2009 to 23 percent in 2012. In the absence of external budgetary support, domestic borrowing 
that funded deficits drove debt and also crowded out private investors (Figure 10a).  
 
Besides the role of primary deficits, Figure 10b shows the importance that ‘other’ items played in 
the debt dynamics. While part of this item can be accounted for by exchange rate movements, 
privatization or other asset transactions, large share of ‘others’ is unexplained. This, together 
with accumulation of arrears, points to the need to strengthen data collection and improve 
transparency. Moreover, the fast debt accumulation– still constrained by the limited government 
borrowing space– showed that should  the external funding become available, policymakers’ 
may need to quickly turn their attention from liquidity to sustainability issues.  
 
International sovereign bonds and debt sustainability 
 
To fund their development needs, African countries have been increasingly accessing sovereign 
international bonds markets. In the first half of 2013, over $2 billion in international sovereign 
debt was issued by African countries. The reduced debt-to-GDP ratios, high growth and 
improved political environments in Africa combined with low interest rates and weakened 
economic conditions in advanced economies have heightened interest of foreign investors in 
opportunities on the continent. This has been reflected in oversubscriptions of Africa’s sovereign 
bonds issued on international capital markets as well as low rates on these bonds. For example, 
the interest rate on Zambia’s first Eurobond ($750 million) issued in September 2012 was only 
5.375; the amount demanded by investors was $11.9 billion. Similarly, Rwanda’s Eurobond 
($400 million) issued in April 2013 was well oversubscribed (demand was $3.5 billion).17  
17 Overall, twelve countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have issued international sovereign bonds since mid-2000s. The 
low yield spreads in the aftermath of the crisis also indicate that Africa’s sovereign bonds are not correlated with 
those of advanced economies and can provide source of diversification. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
  external
  domestic
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
other
primary balance
growth contribution
interest contribution
15 
 
                                                          
Figure 11 shows the example of the progressive decline in spreads on sovereign bonds in Gabon 
and Ghana. The declining spreads suggest some common trends between countries and overall 
improved investor perceptions of Africa. Due to this increased demand, several Sub-Saharan 
Africa sovereign bonds have been traded below an average yield for sovereign bonds with the 
same rating. At the same time, the lower yield spreads, especially in countries with weaker fiscal 
policies, have raised some questions about adequate risk pricing.  
 
Figure 11. Ghana and Gabon: sovereign bond spreads (BSP), 2010 - 2013 
 
Source:  AfDB database.  
 
So far, Africa’s issuance of Eurobonds has changed mostly composition of the public debt, not 
its volume (IMF, 2013). Still volumes of borrowing and use of the borrowed funds need to be 
carefully monitored, especially given the importance than the real interest rate-growth 
differential plays in the continent’s debt sustainability. With rise of interest rates in advanced 
economies, cost of borrowing associated with Africa’s international sovereign bonds may also 
increase in the future as risk pricing becomes more nuanced. From the point of view of longer 
term debt sustainability, this may be a positive development as the use of borrowed funds is 
likely to be more carefully scrutinized. 
 
IV. Conclusions and Policy Discussion 
 
Today, Africa’s public debt-to-GDP is lower than in decades and the overall fiscal policies are 
sustainable. The debt level is also comparable to other developing countries and below that of 
advanced economies. The debt-to-GDP ratio decline was to a large extent due to favorable (and 
in many countries negative) real interest rate and growth differential. In contrast, fiscal policy 
contributed to decline of debt only in oil exporting economies. At the same time, as 
oversubscriptions and favorable terms of Africa’s sovereign bonds have shown, the continent has 
gained attention of international investors which has open up its borrowing space. 
 
Hence debt management strategies need to emphasize growth. For countries with borrowing 
space this includes prudent borrowing for growth-enhancing outlays. However, the interest-
growth differential is subject to shocks: while Africa’s growth prospects are promising, the real 
interest could be rising in the future. Moreover, with feeble global recovery, some downside 
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risks to growth remain, Africa’s increased linkages with South partners notwithstanding. The 
heighted interest of international investors combined with favorable terms has created a window 
of opportunity for African countries to embark on inclusive growth also through prudent 
borrowing, provided the funds are well utilized for growth-enhancing outlays.  
 
More broadly, in the framework utilized in this paper, policymakers can reduce public debt-to-
GDP ratio by: (i) accelerating growth; (ii) improving primary balances through revenue 
mobilization and optimizing of outlays; (iii) reducing the real interest (also by raising inflation) 
and (iv) defaulting.  Since inflation and defaulting undermine other goals that the government is 
likely to pursue (rising living standards of the population, improved access to capital markets), 
we discuss growth and fiscal policies.  
 
The IRGD being the main driver of prudent public debt dynamics in recent years suggests that 
African countries may like to aim at high growth as a key element of their debt sustainability 
strategy.18 Even though Africa’s growth recovery from the crisis’ shock has been fast, in many 
countries is below the trend, pointing at space to grow. Further, for Africa to become a global 
growth pole in the next 2 - 3 decades, growth in the most of this group needs to accelerate 
beyond the pre-crisis rates. 
 
African policymakers need to adopt appropriately prudent fiscal policies and complementary 
monetary policies, while seizing opportunities for growth-enhancing investment, including 
through borrowing. Caution should be exercised when approaching commercial debt markets 
though given the borrowing cost and possibility of shifting sentiments of investors. With low 
revenue-to-GDP ratios, many low income countries can reduce their debt through domestic 
revenue mobilization. They would also benefit from greater efficiency of public expenditures 
and medium term perspective in budgeting. Reducing inefficient spending (e.g., over-sized wage 
bills in Southern Africa, energy subsidies in North Africa) would create space for pro-growth 
outlays (support to SMEs, infrastructure, ICT) and discretion against shocks. Furthermore:  
 
 Countries with high public debt and/or large fiscal deficits – Sudan among oil exporters, 
Eritrea among fragile states, and Cape Verde, Egypt Ghana and Morocco among frontier 
markets and others – may need to undertake fiscal adjustment. The scope and the speed 
should account for its likely impact on investment and growth, to avoid debt traps;19 
 
 In frontier markets with more developed financial system and monetary policy space 
(e.g., Cape Verde, Mauritius), the government could try to ease the impact of fiscal 
adjustment on growth via less tight monetary policy. Further, in some countries, 
especially with long-term domestic debt, slightly higher help ‘inflate the debt away’, even 
though this option is would have other negative implications;    
18 More broadly, policymakers could reduce public debt-to-GDP ratio by: (i) accelerating growth; (ii) improving 
primary balances by raising taxation and/or cutting spending; (iii) reducing the real interest (also by raising 
inflation) and (iv) defaulting.  Since inflation and defaulting undermine other goals that the 
government is likely to pursue (rising living standards of the population, improved access to 
capital markets), we discuss growth and fiscal policies.  
19 Eyraud and Weber (2013) discuss the possible negative short term impact of fiscal adjustment on debt, in cases 
where decline in growth would more than offset the improvements in fiscal balance.  
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 Countries’ effort to regain fiscal policy space and manage debt would also benefit from 
macro frameworks based on fiscal rules and medium-term expenditure frameworks. Such 
frameworks would also help countries transition gradually to counter-cyclical and 
growth-supporting fiscal policies. In countries where rapid debt accumulation is of 
concern ‘debt breaks’ could be also useful. Taking a long-term view, fiscal policy buffers 
are needed for emerging challenges such as creation of social protection schemes; 
  
 African countries also need to strengthen their capacity to carry out independent debt 
sustainability analysis and apply it to their borrowing activities. Together with improved 
debt management capacity, such changes would allow frontier markets to access 
additional (non-concessional) funds while maintaining fiscal sustainability.  
 
 Changes in the IFIs’ debt sustainability frameworks (DSFs), and in particular better links 
between investment and growth may be needed to reflect ‘rising Africa’. Key question in 
this regard is: given the current high growth, lower risk premia, and lower global interest 
rates, what should be the new sustainable debt levels (and thresholds) in various African 
countries, especially frontier markets? 
 
 Besides changes to the DSF, for RMCs reaching objectives of enhanced borrowing space 
and fiscal sustainability hinges critically on increased transparency and improved 
communication. While progress has been made, most RMCs could do much more in 
utilizing technology for sharing information on key fiscal and macro developments. 
Similarly, communicating fiscal stance and changes on it early on (and delivering on the 
announcements) can help raise credibility of fiscal policy.  
 
The African Development Bank has an important role to play to help RMCs regain fiscal policy 
buffers and maintain debt sustainability, while expanding borrowing space for inclusive growth.  
The Bank supports RMCs through its statistical database (needed also for credit ranking), policy 
advise, budgetary and sectoral support, and also by helping countries develop financial markets.  
18 
 
Annex I. Country Classification, Tables and Graphs 
 
Country Classification 
 
1. Oil Exporters:  
 
Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, DRC, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Libya, 
Nigeria, Sudan. 
 
2. Frontier Markets:  
 
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia.  
 
3. Fragile States 
 
Burundi, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Sierra 
Leone, Togo, Zimbabwe.  
 
4. Other 
  
Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Niger, Sao Tome & 
Principe, Swaziland. 
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Annex II. Fiscal and External Buffers by Africa Sub-groups 
 
Table 1a, Annex II. Oil Exporters:  Fiscal and External Buffers, 2008 – 2012e  
  Public Debt Fiscal Balance Total External Debt Curr. Acc. Bal.  
  2008 2012e change 2008 2012e change 2008 2012e change 2008 2012e change 
 
percent of GDP 
Algeria 8.1 9.9 1.8 9.0 -2.7 -11.7 3.5 2.0 -1.5 20.1 5.9 -14.2 
Angola 31.6 29.3 -2.3 -4.5 8.5 12.9 16.6 18.8 2.2 10.3 9.6 -0.8 
Cameroon 9.5 14.9 5.3 2.3 -0.9 -3.2 5.2 8.6 3.4 -1.2 -4.4 -3.2 
Chad 23.4 34.5 11.0 4.5 -1.4 -5.9 15.6 16.2 0.6 8.9 -2.1 -11.0 
Congo, DR 133.1 36.0 -97.0 -3.8 -2.4 1.4 116.3 30.9 -85.5 -17.5 -12.4 5.1 
Congo, R 68.1 21.1 -46.9 23.4 6.1 -17.3 66.7 22.1 -44.6 2.3 3.6 1.2 
Cote d'Ivoire 75.3 49.1 -26.2 -0.6 -3.4 -2.9 80.3 53.2 -27.1 2.3 -1.8 -4.1 
Equat. Guinea 0.8 8.2 7.4 18.7 -2.0 -20.7 0.7 7.8 7.2 -1.2 -14.7 -13.5 
Gabon 16.7 22.0 5.3 10.8 -0.2 -11.1 15.7 11.0 -4.7 23.3 12.6 -10.6 
Libya ... ... ... 26.5 20.9 -5.6 6.3 7.4 1.1 42.5 35.9 -6.7 
Nigeria 11.6 17.8 6.2 6.3 0.9 -5.4 2.1 2.3 0.2 14.1 6.6 -7.5 
Sudan 68.8 97.6 28.8 0.6 -5.0 -5.5 60.2 84.8 24.6 -1.5 -11.2 -9.7 
Average 40.6 30.9 -9.7 7.8 1.5 -6.2 32.4 22.1 -10.3 8.5 2.3 -6.3 
Median 23.4 22.0 -1.4 5.4 -1.1 -6.5 15.7 13.6 -2.1 5.6 0.9 -4.8 
Rel St Dev.  1.0 0.8 3.6 1.3 4.7 1.4 1.2 1.1 2.8 1.8 6.0 1.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AfDB and IMF databases. 
 
Table 1b, Annex II. Fragile states:  Fiscal and External Buffers, 2008 – 2012e 
  Public Debt Fiscal Balance External Debt Curr. Acc. Bal.  
  2008 2012e change 2008 2012e change 2008 2012e change 2008 2012e change 
 
percent of GDP 
Burundi 111.5 32.0 -79.5 -2.7 -1.7 1.0 94.0 22.4 -71.6 -1.0 -15.6 -14.7 
Central Afr. R.  80.2 30.6 -49.6 -1.0 -0.1 0.9 54.2 19.3 -34.9 -10.0 -6.2 3.7 
Eritrea 174.9 125.8 -49.1 -21.1 -13.5 7.6 61.9 29.0 -33.0 -5.5 2.3 7.8 
Guinea 89.9 43.0 -46.9 -1.3 -3.3 -1.9 82.0 63.2 -18.9 -10.6 -34.1 -23.5 
Guinea-Bissau 167.5 59.8 -107.8 -2.4 -1.8 0.6 120.1 20.2 -99.9 -4.9 -6.1 -1.3 
Liberia 315.1 29.1 -286.0 -9.8 -0.5 9.3 291.1 12.1 -279.0 -43.3 -36.7 6.6 
Mali 22.6 32.0 9.4 -2.2 -1.1 1.1 18.9 24.8 5.8 -12.2 -3.4 8.8 
Sierra Leone 42.5 44.5 2.0 -3.5 -2.8 0.7 24.8 23.7 -1.1 -9.0 -20.8 -11.8 
Togo 89.0 46.7 -42.3 -0.9 -6.8 -6.0 56.1 19.2 -36.9 -6.9 -7.9 -1.0 
Zimbabwe 92.2 60.5 -31.8 -2.7 -0.9 1.7 121.8 147.3 25.4 -21.1 -24.1 -3.1 
Average 118.6 50.4 -68.2 -4.8 -3.2 1.5 92.5 38.1 -54.4 -12.4 -15.3 -2.8 
Median 91.1 43.7 -47.3 -2.5 -1.7 0.8 72.0 23.1 -48.9 -9.5 -11.8 -2.3 
Rel St Dev.  0.7 0.6 1.2 1.3 1.3 2.9 0.8 1.1 1.6 1.0 0.9 3.8 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AfDB and IMF databases. 
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Table 1c, Annex II.  Frontier Markets:  Fiscal and External Buffers, 2008 – 2012e 
  Public Debt Fiscal Balance External Debt Curr. Acc. Bal.  
  2008 2012e change 2008 2012e change 2008 2012e change 2008 2012e change 
 
percent of GDP 
Benin 26.9 32.5 5.6 -0.1 -0.8 -0.7 15.6 17.1 1.4 -8.1 -9.8 -1.7 
Botswana 6.4 14.9 8.6 -8.2 0.3 8.4 9.9 21.1 11.2 6.9 4.9 -1.9 
Burkina Faso 23.6 27.7 4.1 -4.3 -3.1 1.1 19.5 24.4 4.9 -11.5 -4.7 6.8 
Cape Verde 67.9 80.0 12.1 -0.7 -7.5 -6.9 60.1 86.0 25.9 -15.7 -11.1 4.6 
Egypt 70.2 80.2 10.0 -8.0 -10.7 -2.7 21.1 13.8 -7.2 0.5 -3.1 -3.6 
Ghana 33.6 56.5 22.9 -8.5 -11.5 -3.1 21.8 26.5 4.7 -11.9 -12.6 -0.7 
Kenya 45.6 48.2 2.6 -4.4 -5.3 -0.9 21.4 25.5 4.1 -6.6 -9.1 -2.5 
Lesotho 52.2 41.9 -10.3 8.9 5.9 -3.1 40.4 33.1 -7.3 10.0 -14.1 -24.1 
Mauritius 44.0 50.3 6.3 -2.8 -1.8 1.0 12.0 15.2 3.2 -10.1 -10.0 0.1 
Morocco 48.2 59.6 11.4 0.7 -7.5 -8.2 20.5 24.3 3.8 -5.2 -9.6 -4.4 
Mozambique 42.1 46.6 4.5 -2.5 -3.0 -0.5 65.1 51.2 -14.0 -12.9 -26.1 -13.2 
Namibia 17.7 26.6 8.9 4.2 -4.1 -8.3 22.7 37.4 14.7 2.8 -1.6 -4.4 
Rwanda 21.4 28.0 6.7 1.0 -1.7 -2.6 17.5 16.9 -0.6 -4.9 -10.9 -6.0 
Senegal 23.9 45.0 21.1 -4.7 -5.7 -1.0 43.7 59.7 16.0 -14.1 -9.8 4.3 
Seychelles 130.0 82.5 -47.5 5.5 1.9 -3.6 81.0 58.1 -22.9 -20.1 -22.0 -1.9 
South Africa 27.8 42.3 14.5 -0.4 -4.8 -4.3 26.7 34.4 7.7 -7.2 -6.3 0.9 
Tanzania 29.2 41.4 12.2 -2.6 -5.0 -2.4 24.1 33.3 9.2 -10.2 -15.8 -5.6 
Tunisia 43.3 44.5 1.2 -0.6 -4.9 -4.3 45.9 52.8 6.9 -3.8 -8.0 -4.2 
Uganda 22.1 34.5 12.4 -2.8 -3.6 -0.8 18.1 23.8 5.8 -7.7 -10.9 -3.2 
Zambia 23.5 26.9 3.4 -0.8 -4.5 -3.7 38.7 29.9 -8.8 -7.2 -3.5 3.7 
Average 40.0 45.5 5.5 -1.5 -3.9 -2.3 31.3 34.2 2.9 -6.9 -9.7 -2.8 
 
Table 1d, Annex II.  Other Countries:  Fiscal and External Buffers, 2008 – 2012e 
  Public Debt Fiscal Balance External Debt Curr. Acc. Bal.  
  2008 2012e change 2008 2012e change 2008 2012e change 2008 2012e change 
 
percent of GDP 
Comoros 57.5 42.6 -14.9 -2.8 3.4 6.2 64.7 38.2 -26.5 -12.1 -5.4 6.7 
Djibouti 43.0 38.6 -4.4 1.3 -2.7 -4.0 60.2 53.9 -6.3 -24.3 -13.4 10.9 
Ethiopia 30.5 21.6 -8.9 -2.9 -1.2 1.7 11.1 19.1 8.0 -5.6 -5.8 -0.2 
Gambia 71.7 77.2 5.4 -1.4 -4.4 -3.1 35.3 43.0 7.7 -12.3 -17.0 -4.7 
Madagascar 31.9 38.3 6.4 -1.1 -3.1 -2.0 38.9 49.4 10.5 -20.6 -7.7 12.9 
Malawi 44.6 54.9 10.3 -4.5 -4.6 -0.1 16.8 20.8 4.0 -9.7 -3.7 6.0 
Mauritania 98.7 79.7 -19.0 -6.5 2.6 9.2 83.0 93.0 10.0 -14.8 -25.8 -11.0 
Niger 21.3 31.1 9.7 1.5 -3.5 -5.0 14.0 20.1 6.1 -13.0 -17.7 -4.7 
Sao Tome & Prin. 60.0 75.5 15.5 14.2 -6.2 -20.4 59.5 85.5 26.0 -34.9 -26.6 8.3 
Swaziland 16.6 19.0 2.4 -0.7 3.7 4.3 15.9 11.2 -4.7 -8.2 0.3 8.4 
Average 47.6 47.8 0.3 -0.3 -1.6 -1.3 39.9 43.4 3.5 -15.5 -12.3 3.3 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AfDB and IMF databases. 
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